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Two particular trends are observable in Belarus’ public relations:
• Public support for the EU (and EaP) is positively changing which is reflected
in the respondents’ perceptions, levels of awareness, general interest and
behavioural preferences
• At the same time, normative underpinnings of public behaviour remain firmly
rooted in cultural traditions and historical legacies of the past
Thematic Block I: Public perceptions of and attitudes to the EU
• Levels of awareness about the EU have positively grown (+3%).
• High public cognizance is further reflected in the correct depiction of the EU
and its institutional and political membership (+ 3%), as well as higher levels
of interest in EU affairs (+5%)
• Twice as many respondents are now familiar with the Eastern Partnership
Initiative (EaP)
• A third of the respondents believe that the EU is an important strategic partner,
which is comparable with those pledging support for the ECU
• Twice as many respondents believe that the EaP now fully corresponds to the
interests of Belarus’ government and its people
• A 10% rise is observed in those who assert that the EaP is founded on
common (rather than EU-owned) values, interests and mutual trust
• Twice as many respondents describe the EU’s image in Belarus as extremely
positive
• For the first time, the respondents substantiate the EU’s reasons to engage
with Belarus as identity-based (‘we are part of Europe’) rather than
geo-strategically conditioned
• The EU is more associated with ‘hope’ (+5%) than ‘indifference’ (-5%)
Thematic Block II: EU-Belarus relations under the EaP: perceptions,
values and ambitions
• A majority of respondents correctly name partner countries involved in the EaP,
and reflect their varied levels of success with EU policies.
• Perceptions of EU-Belarus relations have become more critical: there is a 10%
increase in those who believe that relations with the EU have worsened; while
over a third claim that EU-Belarus relations have stagnated (+10% reflect that
‘there are more talks than actions’)
• A plurality of respondents suggest that Belarus’ image abroad is seen as
increasingly negative (+8%), and fewer (-5%) now assert that the EU would be
interested in cooperating with their country
• At the same time, there is a growing perception that EU-Belarus relations now
fully reflect Belarusian interests (+7%), and that the EU could particularly help
in addressing the most pressing issues of living costs, effective governance and
health system
• Discrepancy in values associated with the EU and their own country persists:
the EU is firmly associated with a ‘liberal democracy model’, while Belarus is
perceived as adhering to a ‘socialist democracy model’
Thematic Block III: Belarus-Russia Relations, including perceptions
of/attitudes to the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU)
• Levels of awareness about the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) are
unprecedentedly high (90%), and the majority of respondents see the ECU as
more relevant in addressing immediate economic and energy security concerns
• ECU is also associated with a hybrid normative model of ‘social democracy’,
which offers a mix of liberal and socialist (egalitarian) values, and is presently
closer to the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Belarusians than the EU’s ‘liberal
democracy’ model
• There is an actualising sense of rivalry between the ECU and the EU, which
may render future cooperation between the two entities in an effort to
modernise Belarus as incompatible
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Thematic Block I: Public
perceptions of and
attitudes to the EU
A temporal analysis of public
surveys undertaken by the PI in
2008-9 and 2013 explicitly
demonstrates a positive and
substantive shift in public attitudes
towards the EU. This is primarily
reflected in higher levels of
awareness, more discernible
knowledge of EU structures and
policies, more interest in EU affairs,
more perceivable commonalities
with the EU as a polity, more
appreciation of EU support
(especially in the areas of
governance, democracy and
education) and most importantly,
identity-based preferences
developing in relation to the latter.
These findings may suggest that
continued engagement and the
increasing presence of the EU in
Belarus have yielded positive
implications on ideational and social
preferences of the population,
incrementally modifying public
behaviour and legitimacy in favour of
the EU as a regional political power.
In particular, the levels of  public
awareness about the EU as a polity,
have positively grown (97%, +3%) to
facilitate more discernible
understanding of  EU structures,
institutions and activities.
Respondents display higher
cognizance in detailing EU
functions, policies and multi-level
actors, in comparison with any other
international organisations cited in
the poll. This is further reinforced by
growing interest in EU affairs (49%;
+5%) and Belarus-EU relations in
particular, against a similar drop in
that of  Belarus-Russia and the CIS.
Twice as many respondents are now
familiar with the EaP initiative (39%)
and correctly name countries and
their progress under the
Neighbourhood framework. Ukraine
and Georgia are listed as the
frontrunners, whereas a rising
number of  respondents (+4%) see
Belarus as a laggard in this
partnership.
Furthermore, EU support is now
seen as more closely corresponding
to the interests of  both government
and the people (a two-fold rise since
2008), and there is a considerable
overlap between what Belarusians
perceive to be ‘most pressing
issues’ of  the day and where the EU
could adequately help. Notably,
while living costs, working
conditions, meagre pensions and
decaying health system are
regarded as imminently failing;
Belarus is believed could learn more
from the EU in the areas of
economic reforms (81%), social
protection (66%), effective
governance (63%) and independent
judiciary (61%). This is particularly
striking when compared to a set of
areas where the ECU’s aid is
believed to be most useful: trade
(70%); economic reforms (51%),
tourism (38%) and energy security
(29%). This comparison indicates (i)
the EU’s growing credibility with the
general public; and (ii) deeper
public understanding of  Belarus’
international relations, especially vis-
à-vis its larger neighbours – the EU
and Russia.
www.kent.ac.uk/politics/gec4 Global Europe Centre Survey Brief
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(+6%), and critically assess Belarus’
image abroad (31%, a two-fold rise
since 2008). Fewer (-5%) now insist
that the EU would be interested in
cooperating with their country
(29%), and many even believe that
Belarus may no longer be important
to their greater neighbour
(52%,+5%). Some begin to view
their country as a security threat to
the neighbourhood (+4%), and even
a ‘foe’ to the EU (+3%) thus
displaying increasingly critical




with the rising credibility of  the EU in
public eyes, and more so, with the
increasing mobility of  the population
as a whole. A growing number of
respondents now travel abroad
(+5%), and have been to the EU
more than once (+4%). This is
against a considerable decline of
those (-20%) who had never
travelled outside the country. Fewer
respondents mention that they had
had any visa problems (-13%); on
the contrary more people feel they
are treated with respect and dignity
by the EU missions in their country
(+7%).
A tenth of  the population have heard
about the programme for
Modernisation initiated by the EU in
March 2012. Many respondents
noted a particular progress in the
areas of  trade, cross-border
cooperation, student exchange, and
economic opportunities. A fifth of
the respondents also assert that this
www.kent.ac.uk/politics/gec
cooperation now also reflects
Belarus’ own interests (+7%) and
should be further encouraged. In
other words, attitudinal and
behavioural changes are striking,
especially given the limited levels of
engagement between the EU and
Belarus under the EaP, and the
growing economic presence of  the
ECU in Belarus’ domestic politics.
Although crucial modifications in
behavioural patterns and
preferences are observable,
temporal comparison of  normative
underpinnings indicates no change
in values patterns which
respondents associate with the EU,
Russia and their own country, and
differences in social modelling
continue to prevail. In particular, the
EU determinedly associates with a
liberal democracy model (Kurki
2010:372), premised on the values
of market economy (48%),
liberalism (43%), human rights
(31%), personal freedoms (27%)
and free media (25%). As cross-
comparison indicates, this model
reveals an enduring pattern of
association that the respondents
applied to the case of  the EU in
2008 and 2013. A set of  values
which respondents correlate with
Belarus, remains uncompromisingly
opposite, and in broad terms could
be described as a socialist
democracy model (Ibid:373). It
necessarily refers to the values of
communal significance, which
primarily are linked to equalisation
and solidarity, tolerance and
forbearance, and which persisted
unaltered since 2008 as registered
by this research: peace/stability
(50%); multiculturalism (34%);
tolerance (33%); social security
(32%) and cultural
traditions/heritage (28%).
Interestingly, the references do not
refer to ‘democracy’ as a value, but
rather prioritise stability, security and
protection. A model which
respondents associate with the ECU
as a new entity offers a curious mix
of  qualities, a hybrid case, which in
spatial presentation, would correlate
more closely with Belarus’ model,
and could be described as a social




• economic prosperity 
• human rights
• personal freedoms 
Hybrid case (ECU)
• peace/stability 
• market economy 
• multiculturalism 
• economic prosperity








triggered by the above-mentioned
polities are profound in their
implications, especially for policy
design and the development of
Closer affinity and greater
awareness concerning the EU
policies are increasingly observable
amongst the respondents. A third of
the respondents assert that the EU
is an important strategic partner,
which is comparable with those
pledging support for the ECU
(39%). Furthermore, in public
assessment of  the EaP’s relevance
and effectiveness, twice as many
respondents have found that
partnership now fully corresponds
to the interests of  Belarus’
government and its people. On
average, a 10% rise is observed
amongst those who affirm that the
EaP is premised on common values
(43%), common economic and
political interests (39%), common
security interests (45%), and mutual
trust (56%). These reflections are
radically different to those in 2008.
In addition, they also witness a
sharp two-fold decline in those who
initially thought Belarus-EU
cooperation was in EU interests and
norms only!
An astonishing two-fold increase is
observable in the positive image of
the EU within the country (55%).
Moreover, when asked to explicate
‘why the EU might be interested in
developing cooperation with
Belarus’, for the first time ever, an
identity-based explanation is put
forward - ‘We are part of  Europe’ - in
addition to geo-strategic reasons.
The EU is increasingly associated
with ‘hope’ (+5%) and ‘enthusiasm’
(+10%); replacing ‘indifference’ (-




In summary, five years on (2008;
2013) public legitimation of  the EU
is clearly on the rise reflecting
positive changes in attitudinal
preferences and behavioural
patterns. Particularly noticeable are
the rising ideational affinity of  the
respondents with the EU, and their
now comparable treatment of  the
EU as compared to that of  the ECU
and Russia (as will be shown further
on). In 2008, as the survey showed,
the population was largely
uninterested and uninformed about
the EU: every fifth respondent had
difficulty in naming EU Member
States, every second failed to locate
the EU headquarters. This has
radically altered by 2013, attesting
to the efforts and benefits of  EU
continued engagement with the
country, particularly associated with
an expanding range of  instruments
(civil society) at the EU’s disposal.




While the attitudes towards the EU
are becoming more positive and
affirmative, the same cannot be said
about the EU-Belarus relations. A
growing number of  respondents
more critically review levels of
engagement between the two sides,
and especially the image of  Belarus
abroad.
In particular, there is a 10% increase
in those who believe that relations
with the EU have considerably
worsened (42%); while another third
assert ‘there are more talks than
actions’ between the two sides, and
the EU-Belarus relations have
clearly stagnated (+10%). More and
more respondents disapprove the
course of  Belarus’ foreign policy
8interest (57%) for a new polity, being
further reinforced by 77% interest in
Russia as well. The majority of  the
respondents see the ECU as more
effective and sustainable way of
addressing some pressing issues of
economy, energy security and trade.
Although the EU is perceived as an
important strategic partner by nearly
a third of  the respondents; a
plurality of  those (39%) nevertheless
states that the ECU has more
precedence.
In normative terms, the ECU is
being prioritised as a polity that
offers a hybrid model of  ‘social
democracy’, which boasts a mix of
liberal and socialist (egalitarian)
values, and presently garners more
cultural affinity amongst the
Belarusian respondents.
At the same time, some diverging
trends also become apparent. In
particular, when faced with the
choice between the EU and Russia
(ECU), the respondents no longer
unquestionably support the latter, as
it was in 2008. Only a third express
their preference for the union with
Russia (a drop of  24%) and another
third is motivated to develop a
closer affiliation with the EU (a rise
by 15%). Only 23% see benefits by
directly prioritising Russia (a drop by
27%), whereas a plurality (37%) is
inclined to support partnership in
both directions.
Finding the right direction for
foreign policy is always a
challenge. Many interviewees now
note that balancing between the
two regional powers may no longer
be sustainable: a plurality (41%)
state that Russia and the EU would
struggle to work jointly in an
attempt to modernise Belarus,
whereas a quarter (26%) insist that
cooperation would be impossible
altogether, owing to their rivalry
status in the region and differing
visions of  the future. These
opinions explicitly underscore
deeper public understanding and
awareness of  Belarus’ complex
politics and growing policy
priorities for the future.
sustainable dialogue at the strategic
level. They also require a full re-
assessment of  practical measures
and instruments to assure
assimilation of  values and the
development (rather than





of/attitudes to the Eurasian
Customs Union (ECU)
Although the respondents display a
growing proclivity towards the EU as
a regional player, Russia and the
ECU nevertheless continue to
garner substantial public support in
the country.
Despite being newly launched
(2010), the ECU in particular
commands an unprecedentedly
high levels of  awareness (90%) and
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In conclusion, the above temporal
comparisons reveal some crucial
changes in public perceptions of
the EU, Russia (including the ECU)
and the Self. More positive attitudes
and perceptions of  the EU now
abound reflecting its better visibility
in the country, although a more
coherent and sustainable
communication policy is still amiss.
Default preferences for Russia and
the CIS are no longer viable, and
are now supplemented by more
cautious and critical public
reflections of  government’ policies
and priorities. Variations are
particularly observable in relation to
the differentiated impact that greater
neighbours might individually exert
on Belarus: Russia is seen as
important for energy security and
trade; whereas the weight of  the EU
is stronger in promoting effective
governance and specific sector
cooperation. The respondents also
emphasise a perceivably negative
image of  Belarus abroad, and also
a rising discordance with the official
foreign policy (+5%). In wider terms
and especially normative
preferences, public opinion may
seem unwavering, but individual





The questionnaire included three
thematic blocks addressing public
perceptions, behavioural patterns
and levels of  awareness about
i The European Union (EU) as a
regional power




including public perceptions of
the Eurasian Customs Union
(ECU)
The findings are compared with
a similar survey undertaken by
the Principal Investigator in
December 2008-9,2 as well as
other available data, including the
EU Neighbourhood Barometer 
East (Autumn 2012)3 and the
IISEPS polls.4




• Reports from regional
headquarters (7 copies)
• Itinerary lists completed by
interviewers (94 copies)
• Instructions for interviewers and
regional leaders
• Technical report of  the survey
94 interviewers were involved in
undertaking the survey. They had 2-
10 years of  polling experience, and
received relevant training in social
research skills.
The sampling was multi-staged,
stratified, and random, and included
1000 respondents. The surveyed
selection was representative of  the
population aged 18+ (urban and
rural) by nationality, sex, region, age
and education. The interview lasted
on average 40-50 minutes using
local languages for interlocution.
The sample representation error
was no more than + 3%. The survey
included 12% random quality
control on completion, undertaken
by the Principal Investigator.
www.kent.ac.uk/politics/gec10
The GEC is based within the School
of  Politics and International
Relations (SPIR) and at the Brussels
School of  International Studies
(BSIS), University of  Kent.
Office for a Democratic
Belarus (ODB)
ODB is Brussels-based
organisation aiming to promote
relations between the EU and
Belarus by way of  specific
programme activities, including:
• Ensuring presence of  Belarusian
and international expertise in
Brussels and other European
capitals which influence the
decision-making process in
relation to Belarus.
• Running information sessions,
conferences, study visits and
round table discussions with the
participation of  leading experts
on Belarus and the region
• Facilitating dialogue between
professionals from civil society
and government, as well as the
harmonisation of  national
programmes and legislative
norms in Belarus with the best
EU/ Eastern Partnership
standards and practices lies at
the core of  the "EU and Belarus:
Sharing Knowledge" programme.
• Through The Clearing House
project, strengthening the
capacity of  local Belarusian
CSOs to increase their qualitative
participation in European
programmes and embed
European values into their every-
day practices.
• Being part of  the Eastern
Partnership Civil Society Forum
(EaP CSF), providing input on
strategic development,
assistance with the newly
established Brussels-based
Secretariat, communication with
National Platforms of  the Forum
and coordination of  its largest
Working Group 1.
ODB Executive Director: 
Olga Stuzhinskaya
E: olga@democraticbelarus.eu
T: +32 2 709 8471
Professor Elena A Korosteleva
(Principal Investigator) is Director of
the Global Europe Centre
(Professional Studies), Jean Monnet
Chair in European Studies at the
University of  Kent, and a
Professorial Visiting Fellow at the
Belarusian State University. Her
main research interests include EU
foreign policies, European External
Action Service, European
Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern
Partnership, EU governance,
democracy promotion and the
concepts of  democracy.
Global Europe Centre
The Global Europe Centre (GEC) is
a new research centre at the
University of  Kent focusing on
Europe, its member states, and its
place in a changing world. The
Centre brings together leading
international academics from
politics and international relations,
economics, law, business, and
European culture in order to explore
the contemporary policy challenges
to Europe and its nation states.
Professor Elena A Korosteleva (Principal Investigator)
is Director of the Global Europe Centre (Professional
Studies), Jean Monnet Chair in European Studies at
the University of Kent, and a Professorial Visiting
Fellow at the Belarusian State University. Her main
research interests include EU foreign policies,
European External Action Service, European
Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership, EU
governance, democracy promotion and the concepts of
democracy.
Nation-wide representative survey was conducted
between 20 May and 4 June 2013 in Belarus, with the
assistance of the Centre for Political Research,
Belarusian State University.
Global Europe Centre Survey Brief
INFORMATION BELARUS’ NATIONAL VALUES
SURVEY (NVS): A TECHNICAL
REPORT1
1 This survey is commissioned by the Office
for a Democratic Belarus (ODB) and
supported by Pact Inc. and SIDA. The
findings are the copyright of  the University of
Kent: Please cite accordingly.
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